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Do the Right Thing: Experimental evidence that preferences for moral
behavior, rather than equity or efficiency per se, drive human
prosociality
Valerio Capraro∗ David G. Rand†
Abstract
Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous
interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences forminimizing
inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard
social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option
and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient
option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game
(DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are
much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that
prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what
they think is morally right.
Keywords: prosociality, morality, equity, efficiency
1 Introduction
Humans regularly pay costs to benefit others. This prosocial
(or “cooperative”) behavior is central to the success of our
personal relationships and the functioning of our societies,
and is more important than ever in the face of global-level
challenges like resource conservation and climate change.
Thus a great deal of research across the natural and social
sciences has sought to understand what motivates people to
be prosocial.
One answer to this question is offered by work demon-
strating myriad long-run benefits that accrue from helping
others: if I pay a cost to give you a benefit today, you may be
more willing to help me in the future, as may others who ob-
serve my action (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dal Bó, 2005;
Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sig-
mund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Trivers, 1971). Thus,
in situations where there are future consequences for cur-
rent actions. pure self-interest can often motivate prosocial
behavior (e.g., Dreber, Fudenberg, and Rand (2014).
However, people are sometimes willing to be prosocial
even when doing so is not self-interested. For example,
decades of research show that many people will pay costs
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to benefit strangers in one-shot anonymous laboratory ex-
periments (Camerer, 2003; Dawes & Thaler, 1988), and
recent work has shown that prosocial behaviors in differ-
ent economic games are typically correlated, both in the
same session and over time (Capraro, Smyth, Mylona &
Niblo, 2014; Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014; Peysakhovich,
Nowak & Rand, 2014; Reigstad, Strømland & Tinghög,
2017). This suggests the existence of stable individual differ-
ences in prosociality, what has been dubbed a “cooperative
phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al., 2014). To explain these
observations, behavioral economists typically employ social
preference models (Camerer, 2003; Camerer & Fehr, 2004).
These models argue that people care about more than just
their own material payoffs.
Widely used social preference models, especially for ana-
lyzing unilateral giving decisions, focus exclusively on out-
comes. They assume that people get psychological benefits
(utility) from the payoffs of others (i.e., are “altruistic” or care
about efficiency, the total payoff of all players) (Charness &
Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004); and/or incur psy-
chological costs (disutility) from when payoffs are unequal
between themselves and others (i.e., are “inequity averse”)
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). (There
are also reciprocity-based social preference models where
people get utility from rewarding positive actions and pun-
ishing negative actions [e.g., Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993)], but these
theories do not make clear predictions about behavior in
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unilateral decisions, which are our focus; thus we restrict
our attention to purely outcome-based preferences related to
efficiency and inequity.)
These social preference models based on efficiency and
inequity have helped to organize a great deal of experimen-
tal data on prosociality in economic games. In these games,
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the Dictator Game
(DG), subjects choose between selfish options that maxi-
mize their own payoff and prosocial options that increase
the other’s payoff and/or reduce inequity. By stipulating that
people vary in the weights placed on efficiency and inequity
in their utility functions, one can account for variation in
behavior in these games.
Despite their success and widespread use, however, many
scholars have argued that human prosociality is not, in fact,
driven by outcome-based preferences. An alternative on
which we focus here is the idea of a generalized morality
preference – that is, the proposal that people vary in the util-
ity they get from “doing the right thing” broadly, instead of
caring specifically about efficiency and inequity (e.g., Alger
& Weibull, 2013; Baron, 2008; Bicchieri, 2005; Brekke,
Kverndokk & Nyborg, 2003; Eriksson, Strimling, Anders-
son & Lindholm, 2017; Huck, Kübler & Weibull, 2012; Jor-
dan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2011; Krupka & Weber, 2013;
López-Pérez, 2008; Mazar, Amir, &Ariely, 2008; Sachdeva,
Iliev & Medin, 2009; Weber, Kopelman & Messick, 2004).
A variety of sources – which sometimes, but not always,
include the extent of efficiency or inequity – influence which
action is “right” in a given situation.
Here, we present new experimental evidence showing the
limitations of outcome-based social preference models of
equity and efficiency concerns, and supporting a generalized
morality preference account. We do so by leveraging in-
dividual differences in prosociality in canonical games (the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, PD, and Dictator Game, DG). Specif-
ically, we examine the correlation between an individual’s
prosociality in these games and their play in a “Trade-Off
Game” (TOG) which pits equity against efficiency – and,
critically, how this correlation varies with the framing of the
TOG.
In the TOG, players unilaterally determine the payoffs of
themselves and two others, and can choose between an option
that is more equitable (all three people earn 13 Monetary
Units (MUs)) and an option that is more efficient (the player
receives 15MUs, while the other two people receive 13MUs
and 23 MUs respectively).
If a stable outcome-based preference for effi-
ciency/altruism drives cooperation in the PD and giving in
the DG, then people who are more prosocial in the PD and
DG should be more likely to choose the efficient option in
the TOG. Conversely, if a stable outcome-based preference
for inequity aversion drives cooperation in the PD and giving
in the DG, then people who are more prosocial in the PD
and DG should be more likely to choose the equitable option
in the TOG. In either case, these correlations should not be
influenced by how the TOG is framed.
The predictions of a general morality preference, however,
are different. Because neither option in the TOG is clearly
more prosocial than the other, having a morality preference
should not lead to a consistent, clearly defined favoring of
one option over the other. Instead, play should be heavily
influenced by the framing (despite the irrelevance of beliefs):
subjects should be much more likely to choose the option
which is presented as the morally appropriate. As a result, if
a general morality preference drives prosociality in the PD
and DG, then people who are more prosocial in the PD and
DG should choose whichever TOG option is presented as
morally right, regardless of whether it is more equitable or
efficient.
In this paper, we present six experiments testing these
diverging predictions. The results cannot be explained by
standard social preference models based on preferences over
outcomes, but they are consistent with the predictions of the
general morality preference account.
2 Study 1
In Study 1, we examine how framing affects play in the
TOG, as well as the relationship between TOG play and
play in a PD. To do so, we compare two different TOG
frames designed to suggest that one choice versus the other
is morally appropriate – and thereby to resolve the ambiguity
that the equity/efficiency trade-offs creates about what the
“right thing to do” is in the TOG. That is to say, we purposely
create an experimenter demand effect — i.e., provide “cues
about what constitutes appropriate behavior” (Zizzo, 2010) –
for either the equitable or efficient TOG choice, and observe
the impact on TOG behavior and cross-game correlation in
play.
Experimenter demand effects are typically seen as prob-
lematic because experimenters are usually trying to assess
how subjects respond to the details of their design (e.g., the
payoffs in an economic game). Thus, injecting cues about
which option is appropriate creates an undesirable alterna-
tive source of variation in behavior, which is particularly
problematic when the choice suggested by the demand effect
is the same as the one hypothesized to be caused by the ex-
perimental manipulation (in which case one cannot tell if the
result is due to the manipulation or the demand effect). This
is not, however, a problem for the experiments we present in
this paper. On the contrary, what we are seeking to study
is precisely the effect of giving information about the ap-
propriateness of different options. The demand effect is our
manipulation, rather than being a confound.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2018 Moral preferences drive human prosociality 101
Equalize Give
Framing of tradeoff game
PD
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
Chosen option in trade−off game
Equitable
Efficient
Figure 1: Results of Study 1 (N=498): Subjects who make
the nice choice in the Trade-Off Game, whichever that is,
cooperate more in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We plot av-
erage cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a function
of the choice made in each of the two frames of the Trade-
Off Game. Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Subjects mak-
ing the “nice” choice in the Trade-Off Game, whichever that
is, cooperate more in the Prisoner’s Dilemma than subjects
who make the “non-nice” choice. Since the nice choice in
the Equalize frame is economically equivalent to the non-nice
choice in the Give frame, this correlation cannot be explained
by outcome-based preferences and suggests that a substan-
tial proportion of cooperators is motivated by a preference for
“being nice”.
2.1 Subjects
We recruit N = 498 subjects living in the US at the time
of the experiment using the online labor market Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT)1.
2.2 Procedure
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four conditions.
In the PD-Give condition, subjects first play the Prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), and then play the Trade-Off game (TOG) in
the “give frame”. In the PD, subjects are given $0.10 and
asked whether they want to “keep it” or “hand it over” to
the other subject. In the latter case, the other subject would
1Experiments on AMT are easy to implement and fast and cheap to
realize. At the same time, numerous studies using economic games have
found that data gathered on AMT are of no less quality than those collected
using physical laboratories (Amir, Rand & Gal, 2012; Horton, Rand &
Zeckhauser, 2011; Suri & Watts, 2011).
earn $0.20. Subjects are informed that the subject they are
matched with is simultaneously facing the same decision. In
the TOG in the “give frame”, subjects in the role of Player
A are grouped with two other subjects (Player B and Player
C) and told that all three players start with $0.13. Subjects
can choose “to be nice” in which case they gain $0.02 and
player B gains $0.10, or “not to be nice”, in which case
nothing happens and all three players remain with $0.13.
Subjects are aware that Player B and Player C are not mak-
ing any decision. In the PD-Equalize condition, subjects
first play the PD and then play the TOG in the “equalize
frame”. The “equalize frame” of the TOG is economically
identical to the “give frame”, but the names of the strategies
are switched: subjects in the role of Player A are told that
they start with $0.15, player B starts with $0.23, and player
C starts with $0.13, and that they can choose “to be nice”
by giving up $0.02 in order “to restore equality” or “not to
be nice”, in which case nothing happens. The Give-PD and
the Equalize-PD conditions are identical to the PD-Give and
PD-Equalize conditions, respectively, apart from the order
in which the games are played. Our main analyses collapse
over game order, which does not interact with TOG framing
(see the Supplementary Information, SI). In this and in the
following experiments, standard comprehension questions
are asked right after presenting the instructions of the Pris-
oner’s dilemma and the Dictator game. Subjects failing any
comprehension question are automatically excluded from the
survey. After the data are collected, bonuses are computed
and paid, on top of the participation fee ($0.50). No decep-
tion is used. Full experimental instructions are reported in
the Appendix.
2.3 Results
As predicted by our account, but not the equity and effi-
ciency preferences account, the frame has a dramatic impact
on TOG play: under the Equalize frame, 47.2% of players
choose the equitable option, compared to only 5.6% under
the Give frame, χ2(1, N=498)=110.4, p<.001. Furthermore,
the frame also reverses the relationship between one’s play in
the PD and the TOG (Figure 1; positive interaction between
frame [0=Give, 1=Equalize] and TOG choice [0=Efficient,
1=Equitable] when predicting PD cooperation using logis-
tic regression: b=2.42, p=.003, see the supplement, Table
S1, for regression details). Under the Equalize frame, sub-
jects that choose the equitable option are muchmore likely to
cooperate (49.1%) in the PD than subjects that choose the ef-
ficient option (22.7%), χ2(1, N=250)=19.1, p<.001. Under
the Give frame, however, the opposite is true (equitable op-
tion, 14.5%C; efficient option, 36.3%C; χ2(1, N=248)=2.8,
p=.09).
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Figure 2: Results of Study 2 (N=379): Subjects who make
the nice choice in the Trade-Off Game, whichever that is,
give more in the Dictator Game. We plot average giving in
the Dictator Game as a function of the choice made in each of
the two frames of the Trade-Off Game. Error bars represent
+/- 1 SEM. Subjects making the “nice” choice in the Trade-
Off Game, whichever that is, give more in the Dictator Game
than subjects who make the “non-nice” choice. Again, since
the nice choice in the Equalize frame is economically equiva-
lent to the non-nice choice in the Give frame, this correlation
cannot be explained by outcome-based preferences and sug-
gests that a substantial proportion of DG giving is motivated
by a preference for “being nice”.
3 Study 2
Study 2 seeks to replicate Study 1’s result regarding the
frame’s effect on TOG play, and to show that the frame
also reverses the relationship between TOG play and play
in a DG where the subject unilaterally chooses how much
of 10 MU to transfer to a passive recipient. Unlike the PD,
beliefs about the other player’s actions have no role in the
DG (since the recipient takes no action). Thus any change in
the relationship between DG and TOG play induced by the
frame cannot be attributed to beliefs.
3.1 Subjects
We recruit N = 379 subjects living in the US at the time of
the experiment on AMT.
3.2 Procedure
Study 2 differs from Study 1 only in that the PD is replaced
by a Dictator game (DG). In the DG, subjects are given $0.10
and are asked how much, if any, to give to another subject
who is given nothing. The other subject is given no choice
and only gets what the first subject decides to give.
3.3 Results
As in Study 1, TOG play is dramatically altered by the frame
in Study 2: under the Equalize frame, 49.2% of players
choose the equitable option, compared to only 9.3% under
the Give frame, χ2(1, N=379)=73.6, p<.001. And, as with
the PD of Study 1, in Study 2 the frame reverses the rela-
tionship between one’s play in the DG and the TOG (Figure
2; positive interaction between frame [0=Give, 1=Equalize]
and TOG choice [0=Efficient, 1=Equitable] when predict-
ing amount transferred in the DG using linear regression:
b=.342, p<.001, see SI, Table S2 for regression details). Un-
der the Equalize frame, subjects that choose the equitable
option transfer substantially more in the DG (40.1% of the
endowment) than subjects that choose the efficient option
(18.7% of the endowment), t(183)=6.6, p<.001. Under the
Give frame, however, the opposite is true (equitable option,
17.2%; efficient option, 30.0%; t(192)=2.05, p=.04).
4 Study 3
In Study 3, we investigate whether our results are robust
to modifying the framing of the TOG. Instead of telling
subjects that they can either choose to be nice or not (by
choosing either the equitable or efficient option, depending
on condition), in Study 3 we compare a Fair frame (where
the equitable option is referred to as “more fair” and the
efficient option “less fair”) with a Generous frame (where
the efficient option is referred to as “more generous” and the
equitable option “less generous”). As in Study 2, we pair the
TOG with a DG.
4.1 Subjects
We recruit N = 263 subjects living in the US at the time of
the experiment on AMT.
4.2 Procedure
Study 3 differs from Study 2 only in that the frame of the
TOG is modified. In the “give frame”, the equitable choice
is termed “less generous choice” and the efficient choice is
termed “more generous choice”. In the “equalize frame”,
the equitable choice is termed “more fair choice” and the
efficient choice is termed “less fair choice”.
4.3 Results
Once again, we see major differences in TOG play based on
the frame: under the Fair frame, 55.3% of players choose the
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Figure 3: Results of Study 3 (N=263): Subjects who
make the positively framed choice in the Trade-OffGame,
whichever that is, give more in the Dictator Game. We
plot average giving in the Dictator Game as a function of
the choice made in each of the two frames the Trade-Off
game. Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Subjects making the
positively framed choice (more generous or more fair) in the
Trade-Off Game, whichever that is, give more in the Dictator
Game than subjects who make the negatively framed choice
(less generous or less fair, respectively). Thus, the findings
from the earlier studies generalize beyond the nice vs non-
nice framing used previously.
equitable option, compared to only 22.9% under the Gen-
erous frame, χ2(1, N=263)=29.0, p<.001. And once again,
the frame reverses the relationship between one’s play in the
DG and the TOG (Figure 3; positive interaction between
frame [0=Generous, 1=Fair] and TOG choice [0=Efficient,
1=Equitable] when predicting amount transferred in the DG
using linear regression: b=.340, p<.001, see SI, Table S3
for regression details). Under the Fair frame, subjects that
choose the equitable option transfer substantially more in
the DG (36.7% of the endowment) than subjects that choose
the efficient option (18.6% of the endowment), t(130)=4.1,
p<.001. Under the Generous frame, however, the opposite
is true (equitable option, 14.3%; efficient option, 30.3%;
t(129)=3.05, p=.003).
5 Study 4
We would like to argue that these framing effects are the
result of changes in subjects’ perception of which TOG op-
tion is the morally correct choice. To provide more direct
evidence for this claim, in Study 4 we recruit subjects to
read the instructions for each game (in random order), and
indicate which option they think is the morally right choice.
5.1 Subjects
We recruit N=369 subjects living in the US at the time of the
experiment on AMT.
5.2 Procedure
Subjects are presented with the rules of the PD, the DG, and
the TOG (both frames), in random order. For each of these
games, they are asked to tell what they think is the morally
right thing to do.
5.3 Results
Unsurprisingly, 80.7% of subjects select cooperation in the
PD, and 88.8% of them select giving half in the DG. Turning
to the TOG, the responses are consistent with our proposal:
the frame reverses subjects’ perceptions of what is morally
right, χ2(1, N=369)=148.6, p<.001. Subjects exposed to the
Equalize frame overwhelmingly (76.8%) rate the equitable
option as the morally right TOG choice, whereas subjects
exposed to the Give frame overwhelmingly (86.4%) rate the
efficient option as the morally right TOG choice.
6 Study 5
In Study 5 we recruit subjects to rule out the alternative
explanation that the frame is operating by changing sub-
jects’ perceptions of the descriptive social norm (i.e., what
they think other people would do (Cialdini & Trost, 1998)),
rather than their perceptions of what is morally right (i.e.,
what they think they should do). To do so, we have subjects
again play a TOG and a DG, but this time cross the Equalize
versus Give frame of the TOGwith a descriptive social norm
manipulation in which subjects are shown the TOG choices
of five previous subjects. In the Equitable Norm condition,
they are shown four subjects who chose the equitable option
and one subject who chose the efficient option. In the Ef-
ficient Norm condition, they are shown four subjects who
chose the efficient option, and one subject who chose the
equitable option.
6.1 Subjects
We recruit N=496 subjects living in the US at the time of the
experiment on AMT.
6.2 Procedure
Study 5 implements a 2x2 design in which, after the DG,
we manipulate the framing of the TOG (as in the Studies 1
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Figure 4: Results of Study 5 (N=496): Manipulating de-
scriptive norm in the Trade-Off Game has virtually no
effect on the correlation between play in the Trade-Off
Game and play in the Dictator Game. We plot average giv-
ing in the Dictator Game as a function of the choice made in
each condition of the Trade-Off game (“frame” stands for the
framing of the TOG, and “norm” stands for the salient norm;
for instance, “norm = Equitable” means that subjects are in-
formed that we have recorded the responses of five subjects
who played before them and four of them have chosen the
equitable option). Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Subjects
making the nice choice in the Trade-Off Game give more in
the Dictator Game, independently of the frame of the Trade-
Off Game and independently of the descriptive norm.
and 2) and the descriptive norm. The descriptive norm is
manipulated by telling subjects that we recorded the choices
of five subjects who played before them and only one of them
did make or did not make the nice choice.
6.3 Results
Both in terms of TOG play, and the relationship between
play in the TOG and the DG, we see that the frame has
a large effect while the descriptive social norm informa-
tion has little effect. In the TOG, subjects are more likely
to choose the equitable option under the Equalize frame,
regardless of the descriptive norm (although the effect is
somewhat weaker under the Efficient Norm condition; lo-
gistic regression shows a significant positive interaction be-
tween frame [0=Give, 1=Equalize] and norm [0=Efficient,
1=Equitable], b=.89, p=.049, see SI, Table S4). With the Eq-
uitable Norm, 65.9% of players choose the equitable option
under the Equalize frame, compared to only 11.7% under the
Give frame, χ2(1, N=254)=78.6, p<.001. With the Efficient
Norm, 53.6% of subjects choose the equitable option under
the Equalize frame, compared to only 16.2% under the Give
frame, χ2(1, N=242)=36.8, p<.001. See SI, Figure S1.
Predicting DG transfer using linear regression, there is
a significant positive interaction between frame [0=Give,
1=Equalize] and TOG choice [0=Efficient, 1=Equitable]
(b=.470, p<.001), as in the earlier studies; but no significant
interaction between Norm and TOG choice nor any higher-
order interactions (p>.3 for all); see Figure 4 and SI, Table
S5. Thus, regardless of the descriptive norm information,
it is the case that under the Equalize frame, subjects who
choose the equitable TOG option give more in the DG than
those who choose the efficient option; and under the Give
frame, the opposite is true. Study 5 therefore demonstrates
that the effects observed in Studies 1-3 were not driven by
the frame creating an implicit descriptive social norm.
7 Study 6
In the previous studies, the choice framed as nice in the
TOG – be it efficient or equitable – is always the active
choice, as is the prosocial action in the DG and in the PD.
Thus, it is possible that the correlation between choosing
the nice option in the TOG game and being prosocial in the
PD/DG is driven by a preference for action, rather than a
preference for morality. To rule out this potential alternative
explanation, Study 6 re-explores the correlation between the
DG and the TOG, but this time using a take frame in the DG:
now the active choice in the DG (taking) is selfish, whereas
the passive choice (not taking) is prosocial. Thus, if the
results of the previous studies were driven by preferences
for action, then in this study we would see a reversal of
the correlation, such that the prosocial choice in the DG
would be correlated with the non-nice choice in the TOG.
Conversely, if, as we argue, our results were instead driven
by preferences for being moral, then we would find the same
pattern as in the previous studies, with the prosocial choice
in the DG being correlated with the nice choice in the TOG.
7.1 Subjects
We recruit N=275 subjects living in the US at the time of the
experiment on AMT.
7.2 Procedure
Subjects are randomly divided in two conditions: the
DGtake-Equalize condition and the DGtake-Give condition,
similar to those in Study 2. The only difference regards the
instructions of the DG. While in Study 2 subjects played the
DG in the standard “Give frame”, here subjects play the DG
in the “Take frame”: they are told that they are paired with
another person and that both of them start with $0.05, and
that they could take any amount between 0$0.00 and $0.05
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Figure 5: Results of Study 6 (N=275): Manipulating the
active choice in the DG has virtually no effect on the cor-
relation between play in the Trade-Off Game and play in
the Dictator Game. We plot average amount unclaimed in
the Dictator Game in the “Take-frame” as a function of the
choice made in each condition of Trade-Off game condition.
Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Subjects making the nice
choice in the Trade-Off Game unclaim more in the Dictator
Game, independently of the frame of the Trade-Off Game.
from the other person. The other person has no choice and
only gets the amount of money unclaimed by the first subject.
7.3 Results
The results are consistent with Study 2. Play in the TOG is
dramatically altered by the frame: under the Equalize frame,
48.2% of players choose the equitable option, compared
to only 13.9% under the Give frame, χ2(1, N=275)=37.5,
p<.001. And the TOG frame reverses the relationship be-
tween one’s play in the DG and the TOG in the same way
as in Study 2 (Figure 5; significant positive interaction be-
tween Equalize frame and equitable TOG choice when pre-
dicting amount unclaimed in the DG using linear regression:
b=.431, p<.001, see SI, Table A6 for regression details). Un-
der the Equalize frame, subjects that choose the equitable op-
tion leaved more money unclaimed in the DG (39.6% of the
endowment) compared to subjects that choose the efficient
option (14.2% of the endowment), t(137)=7.35, p<.001. Un-
der the Give frame, however, the opposite is true (equitable
option, 8.9% unclaimed; efficient option, 26.7% unclaimed;
t(134)=3.09, p=.001). Thus, these results confirm our inter-
pretation that the previous findings are driven by preferences
for morality, rather than preferences for action.
8 Discussion
Decades of experimental research have shown that people
sometimes forgo personal gains for the benefit of others, and
they do so even in unilateral one-shot anonymous interac-
tions. The standard approach in behavioral economics to
understanding this pure prosocial behavior, which cannot
be explained by material self-interest, has been to assume
that people have social preferences for minimizing social
inequities and/or for maximizing social welfare (Bolton &
Ockenfels, 2000; Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Charness & Ra-
bin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Engelmann &
Strobel, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999; Rabin, 1993).
Across six experiments, we present results that are incon-
sistent with equity or efficient preferences per se determining
behavior (and, more generally, with any outcome-based util-
ity function). Instead of making outcome-based evaluations
of all available options, we observe that prosocial people
tend to choose the option that is presented as being morally
right in the given situation, be it equitable or efficient. We
argue that these results support the idea of a general morality
preference.
The idea that people are motivated to be moral is not new.
The drive to appear moral to oneself has received consid-
erable attention in the psychological literature (e.g., Baron,
2008; Bicchieri, 2005; Jordan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2011;
Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin,
2009). Several formal models in the economics literature
have incorporated such ideas, as opposed to preferences for
equity or efficiency per se (Alger & Weibull, 2013; Brekke,
Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; Huck, Kübler & Weibull,
2012). Importantly, however, our results cannot be explained
by any of these particular models. For example, Brekke et
al. (2003) assume that people are motivated to be socially
responsible and to adhere to their individual “moral ideal”.
On the contrary, again, our results show that the moral ideal
is not individual and can be very easily manipulated. Huck
et al. (2012) assume that people choose according to a utility
function that is the sum between their material payoff and a
“social payoff”, which, in turn, is a function of the economic
externalities. Thus, the model by Huck et al. (2012) employs
an outcome-dependent utility function. On the contrary, our
findings cannot be explained by outcome-dependent utility
functions. Finally, the model by Alger and Weibull (2013)
regards symmetric interactions and thus it does not make
clear predictions in our case. Thus, our results push the
boundary of extant theories of morality preferences.
Our critique is also distinct from the reciprocity-based ar-
gument that intentions matter as well as outcomes (Dufwen-
berg&Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk& Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin,
1993), as we largely focus on unilateral decisions where the
other parties take no actions and thus have no relevant in-
tentions. Our results are also inconsistent with norms-based
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preferences where one’s aversion to norm-breaking is con-
tingent on others also following the norm. For example,
López-Pérez (2008) proposes a model in which people gain
utility from choosing appropriate actions, but this utility is
discounted by the extent to which they expect others to act
selfishly and choose inappropriate actions. They in particu-
lar focus on an “E-norm” in which people determine which
actions are appropriate based on some fixed weighting of
equity and efficiency. Neither the E-norm nor their more
general model fit our data, because Study 5 demonstrates
that learning that other people have not chosen the “nice”
option has very little effect on subjects’ behavior: that is,
the effects we observe are not driven by “descriptive norms”
(beliefs about the actions of others). Instead, our experi-
ments demonstrate a causal impact of perceived morality
(an “injunctive norm”) on prosocial behavior.
Prior work on injunctive norms has shown a correlation
between an action’s perceived appropriateness and its like-
lihood of being chosen (Krupka & Weber, 2013). Although
these results are consistent with our general morality pref-
erence account, their correlational nature limits the level of
support they can provide. For example, the observed cor-
relation could be the result of people justifying the action
they want to choose by saying that it is appropriate. Or, both
choices and appropriateness judgements could be driven by
other unobserved variables, including outcome-based pref-
erences that are implemented via heuristics/bounded ratio-
nality (and thus do not perfectly respond to outcomes, e.g.,
Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014) or descriptive social norms
(i.e., perceptions of the frequency of others’ actions). Our
experiments, in contrast,manipulate the perceived injunctive
norm by varying which option is framed as morally right.
We thereby demonstrate a clear, unambiguous causal effect
of perceived morality on behavior. Even more importantly,
we not only examine how average behavior in a specific game
varies as a function of the details of the setup (as in Krupka
andWeber (2013), but also investigate individual differences
in play across games. In doing so, we show that people who
cooperate in the PD and give in the DG typically choose the
TOG action which is framed as morally right (be it equi-
table or efficient). Thus, we show that a preference for moral
action is central to the basic phenomenon of prosocial be-
havior in canonical games, rather than just being important
for explaining deviations from outcome-based preferences
in non-standard game setups.
Our morality preference proposal obviously raises the
question of what action is seen as morally right in any given
scenario (prior modeling work has either side-stepped this
question entirely and just measured perceived appropriate-
ness empirically, e.g., Krupka & Weber, 2013, or has as-
sumed that judgements of rightness are driven by a fixed pref-
erence for equity versus efficiency, e.g., López-Pérez, 2008,
an assumption which our data show is incorrect). Based on
our experiments, we of course cannot provide an exhaus-
tive characterization of morality – and, most likely, morality
judgments are driven at least in part by necessarily-imprecise
heuristics and emotions (Capraro et al., 2014; Greene, Som-
merville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001;
Rand, 2016).
Finally, our data bear on the debate about the basis of
framing effects in economic games. A long literature has
demonstrated that payoff-irrelevant social frames can alter
behavior in economic games. For example, people coop-
erate more in a standard PD that is titled the “Community
game” compared to one titled the “Wall Street game” (Liber-
man, Samuels & Ross, 2004). Some have argued that such
framing effects can be accounted for using stable prefer-
ences for efficiency and equity, once you take into account
the fact that the frames can change peoples’ beliefs about
the actions of others (Ellingsen, Johannesson, Mollerstrom
& Munkhammar, 2012). Support for this position comes
from evidence that frames typically have a substantial effect
only in multi-lateral games where there is uncertainty about
other players’ actions, such as the standard simultaneous PD
or Public Goods Game (Dufwenberg, Gächter & Hennig-
Schmidt, 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Engel & Rand, 2014;
Goerg, Rand & Walkowitze, 2017; Liberman et al., 2004),
but not in games where there is no uncertainty about the
others actions, such as the asynchronous PD (Ellingsen et
al., 2012) or the DG where the other party takes no action
(Chowdhury, Jeon & Saha, 2016; Dreber, Ellingsen, Johan-
nesson & Rand, 2013; Goerg et al., 2017; Grossman &
Eckel, 2015). Contradicting this account, however, are the
results of Krupka and Weber (2013) who do find framing
effects in a DG, as well as Eriksson, Strimling, Anders-
son & Lindholm (2017) and Larrick & Blount (1997), who
find framing effects for the second mover in the Ultimatum
Game. Our results on behavior in the TOG, where the frame
has a dramatic effect on behavior despite it being a unilateral
decision, provide further evidence that beliefs alone cannot
account for framing effects in economic games.
In sum, we have presented six experiments which demon-
strate a causal effect of perceived morality on prosocial be-
havior, and show that responding to this manipulation pre-
dicts prosociality in the PD and DG. Our results cannot be
accounted for by the standard approach to understanding
prosocial behavior in behavioral economics: it cannot be
the case that people’s prosocial behavior is driven per se
by preferences regarding inequity and efficiency (or, more
generally, any outcome-based preferences). Instead, the data
suggest that people have a stable preference for doing what
they understand to be the morally right thing in a given situa-
tion – a preference which cannot be cleanly expressed using
a purely outcome-based utility function.
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Appendix
The building blocks of our experiments
Apart from Study 4, all our studies consist of two-stage
games. In general, we will use the notation X-Y to denote
the treatment in which subjects first play game X, then play
game Y. For the reader’s convenience, in this first section,
we name each possible X and Y. For the exact experimental
instructions, we refer the reader to Section 2.
Prisoner’sDilemma. Subjectswere given $0.10 and asked
whether they wanted to keep it (defect) or hand it over to the
other subject (cooperate). In the latter case, the other subject
would earn $0.20. Subjects were informed that the other
subject was facing the same decision problem.
Dictator Game. Subjects were given $0.10 and asked how
much, if any, they wanted to give to the other person. Sub-
jects were informed that the other person would have no
choice and would only get what they decide to give.
Dictator Game in the “take frame”. Subjects were given
$0.05 and asked how much, if any, they wanted to take from
the other person. Subjects were informed that the other
person would have no choice and would only get the amount
they decide not to take.
Trade-Off Game in the “give frame”. Subjects were
grouped with other two subjects and asked to decide be-
tween “being nice” and “not being nice”. Being nice means
that the decision maker gets $0.15, the second player gets
$0.23, and the third player gets $0.13; not being nice means
that everybody gets $0.13.
Trade-Off Game in the “equalize frame”. Subjects were
grouped with other two subjects and asked to decide between
“being nice” and “not being nice”. Being nice means that
everybody gets $0.13; not being nicemeans that the decision-
maker gets $0.15, the second player gets $0.23, and the third
player gets $0.13.
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Trade-Off Game in the “give frame (generous)” . Sub-
jects were grouped with other two subjects and asked to
decide between “being more generous” and “being less gen-
erous”. Being more generous means that the decision maker
gets $0.15, the second player gets $0.23, and the third player
gets $0.13; being less generous means that everybody gets
$0.13.
Trade-OffGame in the “equalize frame (fair)”. Subjects
were grouped with other two subjects and asked to decide
between “being more fair” and “being less fair”. Being more
fair means that everybody gets $0.13; being less fair means
that the decision-maker gets $0.15, the second player gets
$0.23, and the third player gets $0.13.
Experimental instructions
Herewe report full instructions for each of the gameswe used
in our experiments. The instruction screen started either with
“This is the first part of the HIT” or “This is the second part
of the HIT”, etc., depending on the order of play. We do
not report this part of the instructions. We do not report the
instructions of Study 4, because they were identical to the
instructions of the other studies, with the only difference that
the sentence “What is your choice?” was replaced with the
sentence “What do you think it is the morally right thing to
do?”
Prisoner’s Dilemma
You have been paired with another participant. The amount
of money you can earn depends on your decision and the
other subject’s decision.
You are both given $0.10 and each of you must decide
whether to hand it over or not. Each time a participant hands
over their $0.10, the other participant earns $0.20.
So:
• If you both decide to hand over the $0.10, you end the
game with $0.20
• If the other participant hands it over and you do not,
you end the game with $0.30
• If you hand it over and the other participant does not,
you end the game with $0
• If neither of you hand it over, then you end the game
with $0.10
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand
the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these
questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If
you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and
you will not get any payment.
What choice should YOUmake to maximize YOUR gain?
1. Hand over
2. Don’t hand over
What choice should YOU make to maximize the OTHER
PARTICIPANT’s gain?
1. Hand over
2. Don’t hand over
What choice should the OTHER PARTICIPANT make to
maximize THEIR gain?
1. Hand over
2. Don’t hand over
What choice should the OTHER PARTICIPANT make to
maximize YOUR gain?
1. Hand over
2. Don’t hand over
Congratulations, you successfully answered all the ques-
tions. It is now time to make your decision.
WHAT IS YOUR CHOICE?
1. Hand over
2. Don’t hand over
Dictator Game
You have been paired with another participant. The amount
of money you can earn depends only on your choice. You
are given $0.10 and the other participant is given nothing.
You have to decide how much, if any, to donate to the other
participant. The other participant has no choice and will
really accept your donation.
The other participant is REAL and will really get your
donation.
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand
the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these
questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If
you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and
you will not get any payment.
What is the donation by you that maximizes your bonus?
1. $0
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
7. $0.06
8. $0.07
9. $0.08
10. $0.09
11. $0.10
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What is the donation by you that equalizes your bonus and
the other participant’s bonus?
1. $0
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
7. $0.06
8. $0.07
9. $0.08
10. $0.09
11. $0.10
What amount will you donate to the other person?
1. $0
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
7. $0.06
8. $0.07
9. $0.08
10. $0.09
11. $0.10
Dictator Game in the “take frame”
You have been paired with another participant. The amount
of money you can earn depends only on your choice. Both
you and the other participant are given 5c. You have to
decide how much, if any, to take from the other participant.
The other participant has no choice and will really get the
amount that you decide not to take.
The other participant is REAL and will really get the
amount that you decide not to take.
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand
the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these
questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If
you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and
you will not get any payment.
How much should YOU take from the other participant in
order to maximise YOUR gain?
1. $0.00
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
How much should YOU take from the other participant in
order to equalise your and the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s
gain?
1. $0.00
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
How much will you take from the other participant?
1. $0.00
2. $0.01
3. $0.02
4. $0.03
5. $0.04
6. $0.05
Trade-Off game in the “give” frame
You are Player A. You are playing a game with other two
players, Player B and Player C. Each of you starts this game
with $0.13.
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not
make any decisions).
You can either choose to be nice or not. If you choose to
be nice, you earn an additional $0.02 and Player B earns an
additional $0.10. If you choose not to be nice, no one earns
any additional money and you all end the game with $0.13.
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and
Player C. They will not have the opportunity to influence
your gain in later parts of the HIT.
What do you want to do?
1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
Trade-Off game in the “equalize” frame
You are playing a game with other two players, Player B
and Player C. You start this game with $0.15, Player B starts
with $0.23 and Player C with $0.13.
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not
make any decisions).
You can either choose to be nice or not. If you choose to
be nice, you give up $0.02 to restore equality, so that you
all earn $0.13. If you choose not to be nice, no changes are
made to the payoffs, and you each earn what you have started
with.
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and
Player C. They will not have the opportunity to influence
your gain in later parts of the HIT.
What do you want to do?
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1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
Trade-Off game in the “give (generous)” frame
You are Player A. You are playing a game with other two
players, Player B and Player C, different from the one you
were paired with before. Each of you starts this game with
$0.13.
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not
make anydecisions).
You can either choose to be more generous or less gen-
erous. If you choose to be more generous, you earn an
additional $0.02 and Player B earns an additional $0.10. If
you choose to be less generous, no one earns any additional
money and you all end the game with $0.13.
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and
Player C. They will not have the opportunity to influence
your gain in later parts of the HIT.
What do you want to do?
1. Be more generous
2. Be less generous
Trade-Off game in the “equalize (fair)” frame
You are Player A. You are playing a game with other two
players, Player B and Player C. You start this game with
$0.15, Player B starts with $0.23 and Player C with $0.13.
You get to make a choice (Player B and Player C do not
make any decisions).
You can either choose to be more fair or less fair. If you
choose to be more fair, you give up $0.02 to restore equality,
so that you all earn $0.13. If you choose to be less fair, no
changes are made to the payoffs, and you each earn what you
have started with.
This is the only interaction you have with Player B and
Player C. They will not have the opportunity to influence
your gain in later parts of the HIT.
What do you want to do?
1. Be more fair
2. Be less fair
Trade-Off game in the “give” frame with the efficient
norm
Instructions were exactly the same as in the “give” frame, a
part from the decision screen that was replaced by:
We have recorded the choices of five players who partici-
pated in this part of the HIT before you:
Previous players choosing to be nice: 4
Previous players choosing NOT to be nice: 1
What do you want to do?
1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
Trade-Off game in the “give” frame with the equitable
norm
Instructions were exactly the same as in the “give” frame, a
part from the decision screen that was replaced by:
We have recorded the choices of five players who partici-
pated in this part of the HIT before you:
Previous players choosing to be nice: 1
Previous players choosing NOT to be nice: 4
What do you want to do?
1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
Trade-Off game in the “equalize” frame with the efficient
norm
Instructionswere exactly the same as in the “equalize” frame,
a part from the decision screen that was replaced by:
We have recorded the choices of five players who partici-
pated in this part of the HIT before you:
Previous players choosing to be nice: 1
Previous players choosing NOT to be nice: 4
What do you want to do?
1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
Trade-Off game in the “equalize” frame with the equi-
table norm
Instructionswere exactly the same as in the “equalize” frame,
a part from the decision screen that was replaced by:
We have recorded the choices of five players who partici-
pated in this part of the HIT before you:
Previous players choosing to be nice: 4
Previous players choosing NOT to be nice: 1
What do you want to do?
1. Be nice
2. Don’t be nice
